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Abstract
Adaptivity to changing environments and constraints is key to success in modern society.
We address this view by proposing “incrementalized versions” of Stable Marriage and
Stable Roommates. That is, we try to answer the following question: for both problems,
what is the cost of adapting an existing stable matching after some of the preferences of
the agents have changed. While doing so, we also model the constraint that the new stable
matching shall be close to the old one. After formalizing these incremental versions, we
provide a fairly comprehensive picture of the computational complexity landscape of Incre-
mental Stable Marriage and Incremental Stable Roommates. To this end, we
exploit the parameters “degree of change” both in the input (difference between old and
new preference profile) and in the output (difference between old and new stable match-
ing). We obtain both hardness and tractability results, among the latter being one of the
few fixed-parameter tractability results (exploiting the parameter “distance between old and
new stable matching”) in the context of computationally hard stable matching problems.
1 Introduction
Imagine the following scenario. A manager responsible for a group of 2n workers has to form
n two-worker teams based on the preferences over potential work partners of each worker. The
manager, being interested in a robust solution, a stable matching (indeed, this refers to the
Stable Roommates problem) is computed. However, say every month the workers may up-
date their preferences about wanted work partners (the updates may e.g. be based on gained
experiences, new information, newly developed personal skills etc.). The team manager then
has to find a new stable matching respecting the individually evolved preferences. To this end,
however, the team manager may not want to allow too radical changes in the composition of
the two-worker teams because this might e.g. overburden administration. Thus, a moderate
change is acceptable, but too radical changes in the team compositions should be avoided when-
ever possible. We address this scenario by introducing and studying “incremental versions” of
the two most prominent stable matching problems, namely Stable Marriage and Stable
Roommates.1
∗Supported by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and
innovation programme under grant agreement numbers 677651.
†Supported by the DFG, project MaMu (NI 369/19).
‡Supported by CAS-DAAD Joint Fellowship Program for Doctoral Students of UCAS. Work done while with
TU Berlin.
1The naming “Incremental” is inspired by work in the context of clustering and information retrieval [6].
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In stable matching scenarios or, in other words, in matching under preferences [25], one is
given a set of agents, who have preferences over (some of) the other agents, and one wants to
match pairs of agents such that the outcome is stable. Informally speaking, stability means that
there are no two unmatched agents that would both prefer to be matched with each other instead
of with their current partners in the matching. Two classic problems here are the bipartite case
with two equal-sized sets of agents (referred to as Stable Marriage) and the general case of
an even number of agents (referred to as Stable Roommates). Motivated by the introductory
considerations, we next introduce “incremental versions” of both problems; refer to Section 2
for further formal definitions.
Incremental Stable Marriage
Input: Two disjoint sets U and W of n agents each, two preference profiles P1 and P2
for U ⊎W , a stable matching M1 for profile P1, and a non-negative integer k.
Question: Does U ⊎ W admit a stable matching M2 for profile P2 such
that dist(M1,M2) = |M1∆M2| ≤ k?
Herein,M1∆M2 denotes the symmetric difference between setsM1 andM2. The incremental
setting for Stable Roommates is defined analogously.
Incremental Stable Roommates
Input: A set V of 2n agents, two preference profiles P1 and P2 for V , a stable
matching M1 for profile P1, and a non-negative integer k.
Question: Does V admit a stable matchingM2 for profile P2 such that dist(M1,M2) =
|M1∆M2| ≤ k?
In both definitions there are two main regulating screws. First, we are given two preference
profiles, the old P1 and the new P2, thereby reflecting the change of preferences. Indeed, to reflect
only moderate changes (“evolution”), we will subsequently measure the difference between the
two profiles (later referred to as “swap distance”), yielding a natural problem-specific parameter
(the smaller it is, the less revolutionary the changes are). Second, the number k can be interpreted
as a locality parameter—it exposes how close the new matching has to be to the old one. The
smaller we choose k, the more conservative we are with respect to change in the outcome (namely
between old and new stable matching). Together, we thus have one parameter to regulate the
degree of change measured in the input preferences and one parameter to regulate the degree of
change measured in the output stable matching solutions. Taking up these two “parameters” we
provide a thorough parameterized complexity analysis of these kinds of dynamic stable matching
problems.2 To this end, we also distinguish between preferences with and without ties. Roughly
speaking, we provide positive (fixed-parameter) tractability results in the case without ties and
several (parameterized) intractability results for the case with ties. Before describing our results
in more detail, however, we discuss some of the related work.
1.1 Related work
There is previous work on matching-related problems in the context of dynamic graph algorithms
where vertices and/or edges arrive or depart iteratively over time. The goal then is to main-
tain a solution of sufficient quality by performing necessary updates after every single change.
For instance, Bhattacharya [3] studied the maintenance of near-popular matchings (a scenario
2In the large field of dynamic graph algorithms, which significantly differs from our setting, the term “dynamic”
refers to more fine-grained scenarios where typically edges and/or vertices may be added or deleted in a stepwise
fashion, and one wants to efficiently update a solution after every such single change. In particular, this has also
been studied in the (popular and stable) matching context [3, 15, 29]. The main difference to our work is that we
study changes between two preference profiles (not so much in the graph structure), and the changes can be at
a larger scale. Moreover, we perform parameterized complexity studies which do not play a role in this previous
work.
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related to stable matchings) based on a greedy improvement strategy, heavily employing max-
imum vertex degree in their analysis. Ghosal et al. [15] and Nimbhorkar and Rameshwar [29]
study dynamic rank-maximal and popular matchings, again within the setting of dynamic graph
algorithms and a focus on update times after each single change in the graph.
Genc et al. [12, 13, 14] studied robustness of a matching in Stable Marriage. Herein,
the robustness of a given stable matching is measured by the number of modifications needed
to find an alternative stable matching if some currently matched agent pairs break up. They
define an (x, y)-supermatch as a stable matching that satisfies the following property: If any
x agents break up, then it is possible to rematch these x agents so that the new matching
is again stable; further, this re-matching has to be done by breaking at most y other pairs.
Genc et al. [12, 13] showed that determining whether a given matching is a (1, y)-supermatch
is polynomial-time solvable, while deciding whether a (1, 1)-supermatch exists already becomes
NP-complete. The main distinguishing features compared to our model are that, using our two
regulating screws mentioned above we can model both moderate changes in the preferences
(that is, the input) and moderate differences between the old and the new stable matching
(that is, the output). Indeed, we perform a parameterized complexity analysis exploiting these
parameters while Genc et al. [12, 13, 14] focus on classic complexity results and use heuristics
in experimental work. Moreover, we model changing preferences while they address breaking up
matched pairs. Finally, our main contributions are in the Stable Roommates case while they
exclusively focus on Stable Marriage without ties.
Mai and Vazirani [23, 24] presented another “robust” version of Stable Marriage, incor-
porating a probabilistic error model. They provide polynomial-time algorithms in this context.
Their investigations thus are further away from what we are doing than the work of Genc et
al. [12, 13].
Marx and Schlotter [26, 27] studied local search aspects for the NP-hard Stable Marriage
with ties. More specifically, they investigated the parameterized complexity of a local search
variant of Stable Marriage using parameters such as the number of ties, etc. Thus, the
main overlap with our work is in terms of searching for local improvements and employing
parameterized complexity analysis—the studied computational problems are different from ours
as they do not model changes in the input preferences.
Recently, there have been numerous other models and investigations to enrich the basic
stable matching model, including the use of only partially ordered preferences [10], “multilayer”
stable matchings with several preference profiles to be obeyed ‘in parallel’ [2, 8, 28], or studying
robust stability from a quantitative angle [9].
Finally, let us briefly mention that the motivation for our incremental scenario for stable
matching is related to similar scenarios in the context of clustering [6, 22], coloring [18], other
dynamic versions of parameterized problems [1, 21], and reoptimization [4, 30].
1.2 Our contributions
Besides introducing a fresh model of stable matching computations, we provide results mostly in
terms of parameterized complexity for both Incremental Stable Marriage and Incremen-
tal Stable Roommates, where we see the main technical contributions mostly for the latter.
In particular, our main algorithmic result is that Incremental Stable Roommates for input
instances without ties is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the parameter k (distance
between the old and the new matchings). To show this, we heavily use structural results due
to Irving [20] and Gusfield [16] and show how to exploit them for designing a fixed-parameter
algorithm.
Most of our results are surveyed in Table 1. Herein, P1 ⊕ P2 denotes the swap distance
between two preference profiles (see Section 2 for formal definitions). The table indicates that
we obtained a fairly complete picture of the computational complexity landscape, e.g. also
complementing W[1]-hardness results with corresponding XP-algorithms.
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Ties |P1 ⊕ P2| Incr. Stable Marriage Incr. Stable Roommates
no any P (Prop. 2) FPT for k := dist(M1,M2) (Thm. 1)
W[1]-hard for k′ := |M1 ∩M2| (Prop. 6)
yes 1 W[1]-hard for k (Thm. 2) W[1]-hard for k, even for compl. pref. (Thm. 4)
NP-hard even if k′ ≥ 0 (Thm. 4)
yes 2 W[1]-hard for k′ (Thm. 3) W[1]-hard for k′ (Thm. 3)
yes any XP for k (Prop. 3) XP for k (Prop. 3)
Table 1: Overview of our results. Incremental Stable Marriage results are for incomplete
preferences and Incremental Stable Roommates results are for complete preferences.
Finally, we mention in passing that to achieve our results, throughout the work we also intro-
duce and study some intermediate problems (for instance, Edge-Incremental Independent
Set) which may be of independent interest and prove useful in other settings.
2 Definitions and notations
In this section, we review fundamental concepts used in matchings under preferences.
Preference lists and profiles. Let V = {1, 2, . . . , 2n} be a set of 2n agents. Each agent i ∈ V
has a subset Vi ⊆ V \ {i} of agents which they find acceptable as partners and has a preference
list i on Vi (i.e., a transitive and complete binary relation on Vi). Here, x i y means that i
weakly prefers x over y (i.e. x is at least as good as y). We use ≻i to denote the asymmetric
part (i.e., x i y and ¬(y i x)) and ∼i to denote the symmetric part of i (i.e., x i y and
y i x). If x ∼i y, then we also say that x and y are tied in i’s preference list and that agent i
has ties in their preference list.
For two agents x and y, we call x most acceptable to y if x is a maximal element in the
preference list of y. Note that an agent can have more than one most acceptable agent. For two
disjoint subsets of agents X ⊆ V and Y ⊆ V , X ∩ Y = ∅, we write X i Y if for each pair of
agents x ∈ X and y ∈ Y we have x i y.
A preference profile P for V is a collection (i)i∈V of preference lists for each agent i ∈ V .
A profile P may have the following properties:
1. It is complete if for each agent i ∈ V it holds that Vi ∪ {i} = V ; otherwise it is incomplete.
2. The profile P has ties if there is an agent i ∈ V with ties in their preference list.
To an instance (V,P) we assign an acceptability graph G, which has V as its vertex set and two
agents are connected by an edge if each finds the other acceptable. Without loss of generality,
G does not contain isolated vertices, meaning that each agent has at least one agent which it
finds acceptable.
Swaps and differences between two matchings. Given two preference lists  and ′, the
swap distance between  and ′ is defined as the number of pairs that are “ordered” differently;
if  and ′ are defined on different sets, then we assume that this distance is infinite. Formally,
δ(,′) :=


∞,  and ′ are defined on different sets,
|{(x, y) | x ≻ y ∧ y ′ x}|+
|{(x, y) | x ∼ y ∧ (x, y) /∈∼′}|, otherwise.
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For example, if an agent has a preference list on {a, b, c} where all three agents are tied on the
first position, that is, a ∼ b ∼ c, then moving to the list c ≻ {a, b} requires two swaps.
Let P1 and P2 be two preference profiles for the same set V of agents. The swap distance
between P1 and P2, denoted as |P1 ⊕ P2|, is defined as the sum of the swap distances between the
preference lists of each agent in the two preference profiles. Formally, let ji be the preference
list of an agent i ∈ V in the profile Pj for j = 1, 2; we have that |P1 ⊕ P2| =
∑
i∈V δ(
1
i ,
2
i ).
Given a set V of agents and a profile P, amatching M is a set of disjoint (i.e., nonintersecting)
pairs of agents in V . Given two matchings M1 and M2 for the same set V with 2n agents, we
define the distance between M1 and M2 as the size of the symmetric difference of M1 and M2,
formally: dist(M1,M2) := |M1∆M2| = |M1 \M2|+ |M2 \M1|.
Blocking pairs and stable matchings. Let a preference profile P for a set V of agents, the
corresponding acceptability graph G, and a matching M ⊆ E(G) be given. For a pair {x, y} of
agents, if {x, y} ∈ M , then we denote the corresponding partner y by M(x); otherwise we call
this pair unmatched. We write M(x) = ⊥ if agent x has no partner, i.e. if the agent x is not
involved in any pair in M . We use ⊥(M) to denote the set of unmatched agents in a matching
M , that is, ⊥(M) = {u |M(u) = ⊥}. If no agent x has M(x) = ⊥ (i.e., ⊥(M) = ∅), then M is
perfect.
Given a matching M of P, an unmatched pair {x, y} ∈ E(G) \M is blocking M if both x
and y prefer each other to being unmatched or to their assigned partners, i.e. it holds that(
M(x) = ⊥ ∨ y ≻x M(x)
)
∧
(
M(y) = ⊥ ∨ x ≻y M(y)
)
. We call a matching M stable3 if no
unmatched pair is blocking M . The Stable Roommates problem is defined as follows:
Stable Roommates (SR)
Input: A preference profile P for a set V = {1, 2, . . . , 2n} of 2n agents.
Question: Does P admit a stable matching?
Stable Roommates and Stable Marriage. The bipartite variant of Stable Roommates,
called Stable Marriage, has as input two n-element disjoint sets U ⊎W of agents such that
each agent u ∈ U from U has a preference list on Wu ⊆ W and each agent w ∈ W from W
has a preference list on Uw ⊆ U . By definition, the underlying acceptability graph of a Stable
Marriage instance is bipartite. Accordingly, this instance has complete preferences if this
graph is a complete bipartite graph.
The following fundamental result from the literature guarantees that we can deal with in-
complete preferences without ties similarly to the case with complete preferences with ties.
Proposition 1 ([17, Theorem 1.4.2, Theorem 4.5.2]). For incomplete preferences without ties,
the whole agent set can be partitioned into two disjoint subsets R and S such that every stable
matching matches every agent from R and none of the agents from S. For agent sets of size 2n,
this partition can be computed in O(n2) time.
3 Algorithms for Incremental Stable Marriage and Roommates
As a warm-up, we first show that our most restricted problem variant, Incremental Stable
Marriage without ties, can be solved in polynomial time. The main idea behind this result is
based on the fact that there exists an compact and polynomial-time computable representation
of all stable matchings, the so-called partially ordered set of polynomially many rotations [17,
Chapter 2]. Herein, a rotation involves a subset of some stable matching “reducing” which results
in another stable matching [17, Chapter 2.5.1]. Equipping these rotation with some appropriate
weight, we can reduce our problem to finding a closed subset of rotations with maximum weight,
3We exclusively focus on the weak stability concept [25]. We conjecture that several results will also hold at
least for strong stability. The proofs, however, may need non-trivial adjustments.
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which can be solved in polynomial-time using an approach similar to the one discussed in [17,
Chapter 3.6.1]. We refer to Appendix A for proof details.
Proposition 2. For preferences without ties, Incremental Stable Marriage can be solved
in O(n3) time.
Proof. The result from Proposition 2 follows from Lemma 9 and Lemma 10.
Second we show that our least restricted NP-hard problem variant, Incremental Stable
Roommates with ties allowed, can at least be solved in polynomial time when the distance
between the matchings M1 and M2 is a constant.
Proposition 3. Incremental Stable Roommates with ties can be solved in nO(k) time,
where k = |M1∆M2|.
Proof. Let nˆ = |M1|. The algorithm first guesses positive integers k1, k2 with k1+ k2 ≤ k which
we further treat as follows. We denote by k1 the number of matching edges leaving M1 (that
is, |M1 \M2|) and by k2 the number of new edges (that is, |M2 \M1|). Now, for each such
pair (k1, k2) we first guess k1 edges to delete from M1. Notice that there are O(nˆ
k1) = O(nk)
possible guesses. Let Mˆ1 be the rest of the matching M1 (after we delete the just guessed
edges). Then we guess k2 pairs of vertices not matched in Mˆ1. This completely defines the
matching M2 which can be checked in polynomial-time for stability. Notice that there are(2n−2nˆ+2k1
2k2
)
· (2k2)!2·k2! = O(2k
2k · (2n)2k) possible guesses. Repeating the above procedure for every
pair (k1, k2) and applying the obvious bound k ≤ n, we get the overall running time n
O(k) as
claimed.
The most pressing question following from Proposition 3 is to ask for which cases this result
can be improved to a fixed-parameter algorithm for the parameter k, the distance between M1
and M2. Unfortunately, we will show in the next section that this is not possible when ties are
involved. For the remainder of this section, however, we show that this is possible when ties are
not allowed. Formally, we show the following.
Theorem 1. Incremental Stable Roommates without ties is solvable in O(2kn4) time.
The remainder of this section is devoted to show our main result: the algorithm behind
Theorem 1, which is inspired by the polynomial-time algorithm for solving maximum weight
stable marriage [17, Chapter 2.5.1] (also see Appendix A for more details). The high-level
structure of our algorithm is as follows:
1. Using the algorithm of Irving [19] and based on the structural insights of Gusfield [16]
that the set of all stable matchings can be compactly and efficiently represented via the
so-called partially ordered set (poset) of polynomially many rotations, we compute the
poset of rotations for the new preference profile P2 (see Section 3.1).
Roughly speaking, a rotation (relative to a preference profile) involves a specific cyclic
sequence σ of agents where the first acceptable partner in the preference list of each agent
x in σ is exactly the second acceptable partner in the preference list of x’s predecessor
in σ. We remark that for a rotation, removing the first acceptable partner of each agent σ
will not alter the existence of a stable matching.
2. To capture the (different) costs of eliminating one rotation from each dual pair with respect
to the resulting distance between the matching M1 and M2, we compute two weights for
each rotation (see Section 3.2).
3. Finally, to consistently choose one rotation from each dual pair, and additionally respecting
the weight constraints, we reduce our problem to an auxiliary problem to be defined below
and provide a fixed-parameter algorithm for this auxiliary problem (see Section 3.3).
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Each high-level step of the algorithm will be described in one of the subsequent subsections.
To define our auxiliary problem (which may be of independent interest), for each partially
order set (R,D), we say that a given subset C ⊆ R is closed with respect to the relation D if for
each pair {q, r} ⊆ R of elements it holds that r ∈ C and q D r imply q ∈ C.
Weighted Conflict-Free Closed Subset
Input: A partially ordered set (R,D), an undirected graph G = (R,E), a weight
function w : R→ N, a positive integer ℓ, and a budget b ∈ N.
Question: Does there exist a closed subset C ⊆ R of size ℓ which is independent in
G such that
∑
c∈C w(c) ≤ b?
Here, the conflicts are modeled by the edges so that the graph is also referred to as a conflict
graph and seeking for an independent set solution means seeking for a conflict-free set. The
structure of the rotation poset implies that in our case the graph G in fact consists of ℓ edges
forming a matching of size ℓ. In particular, we will show that we can focus on the special case
in which the conflictgraph G consists of ℓ disjoint cliques. For this case we give an algorithm
for Weighted Conflict-Free Closed Subset for parameter b +∆(G), where ∆(G) is the
maximum vertex degree in the graph G. Moreover, it follows from our reduction procedure that
b ≤ k (see Section 3.3).
3.1 Preprocessing and identification of the rotations
We first recall Irving’s polynomial-time algorithm [19] for determining whether an instance of
Stable Roommates without ties has a stable matching and fundamental structural properties
behind all stable matchings [16]. Irving’s algorithm is divided into two phases: Phase 1 and
Phase 2. Phase 1 involves a sequence of proposals from each agent i to the first agent j on i’s
list, and each such proposal resulting in the deletion of all successors of i from j’s list. Phase 1
does not alter any stable matching since in this phase j is removed from i’s preference list (and i
is removed from j’s preference list) only when (i, j) does not form a pair in any stable matching.
The set of lists at the end of the first phase is called Phase 1 table (please refer to Example 1 in
Appendix B).
There are three possibilities for the Phase 1 table; note that the Phase 1 table is unique.
Every list in the table is empty. Then, there is no stable matching; note that Irving’s orig-
inal algorithm assumes that the input preferences are complete, implying that whenever a
list becomes empty, then there is not stable matching; for incomplete preferences we can
only infer the non-existence of any stable matching if every list becomes empty.
Every non-empty list contains exactly one agent. Then, we find a unique stable match-
ing.
Not every list is empty and at least one list contains more than one agent. Then, we
proceed to Phase 2.
For agents with empty preference lists in the Phase 1 table, we observe that following.
Proposition 4 ([17, Theorem 4.5.2]). For each agent, if its preference list becomes empty after
Phase 1, then it will not be matched by any stable matching; otherwise it must be matched by all
stable matchings.
Since in the first two cases the instance is trivial to solve, we assume the third case in the
following and we can ignore every agent whose list becomes empty after Phase 1. Notice that
in the Phase 1 table we always have that if an agent i is ranked first in j’s preference list, then
j is ranked the last in i’s preference list. This invariant we keep throughout the whole Phase 2.
We need some definitions for Phase 2. A preference table is the Phase 1 table or any Phase 2
table (i.e., it is a collection of preference lists).
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Definition 1 (Rotations). A rotation exposed in a preference table T is an ordered sequence
(e0, h0), (e1, h1), . . . , (er−1, hr−1)
of pairs such that on ei’s list hi is the first agent and hi+1 is the second agent in T , for
all 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1, where i+ 1 is taken modulo r.
Note that if (e, h) is a pair in a rotation, then e is ranked last by h with respect to T .
Definition 2 (Elimination of an exposed rotation). The elimination of an exposed rotation (e0, h0), (e1, h1), . . . , (er−1, hr−1)
from table T is the following operation. For every 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1, remove every entry below ei
in hi+1’s list in T , i.e., move the bottom of hi+1’s list up to ei (from ei+1). Then for each
agent k who was just removed from hi+1’s list, remove hi+1 from k’s list.
In Phase 2, exposed rotations (refer to Example 1, Appendix B) are eliminated from the
preference table one by one until some list becomes empty, which means there is no stable
matching, or no rotation is exposed in the table, which means the list of every agent contains
exactly one agent and we get a stable matching.
Proposition 5 ([20, Corollary 3.2]). If some agent obtains an empty preference list in Phase 2,
then there is no stable matching.
There are two types of rotations, which can be used to characterize all stable matchings.
Definition 3 (Dual and singleton rotations). Let D denote the execution tree when Phase 2 is ex-
ecuted in all possible ways on the Phase 1 table. Each node x in D represents a table T (x), which
is the current table state of the algorithm at node x. If ρ = ((e0, h0), (e1, h1), . . . , (er−1, hr−1)) is
a rotation exposed in some table in D, then the negation of ρ is defined as
¬ρ = ((h0, er−1), (h1, e0), . . . , (hr−1, er−2)).
If ¬ρ is also exposed in some table in D, then we call ρ and ¬ρ a dual pair of rotations. Any
rotation without a dual is called a singleton rotation.4
Definition 4 (Partially ordered set, and closed and complete subest of rotations). Let R be
the set of all rotations which are exposed in some table of some node in D. A subset C ⊆ R of
rotations is complete if it contains
(i) all singleton rotations and
(ii) exactly one rotation from each dual pair of rotation.
A binary relation ⊲ on R is defined as follows. For each pair {ρ1, ρ2} of rotations, if the
elimination of ρ1 is necessary for ρ2 to be exposed (i.e., the elimination of ρ1 precedes the
exposition of ρ2 on every path in D), then we say that ρ1 precedes ρ2, written as ρ1 ⊲ ρ2. The
partial order D is the reflexive closure of the precedence relation ⊲. A subset C of the rotation R
is closed with respect to the partial order D (in short, closed) if for each pair {ρ1, ρ2} of rotations
it holds that if ρ2 ∈ C and ρ1 D ρ2, then ρ1 ∈ C.
Note that the rotation poset D on R is an O(n2)-sized representation of all stable matchings.
It follows from Gusfield [16] that one can compute R in O(n3 · log(n)) time.
Lemma 1 ([16]). For a given Stable Roommates instance without ties, there is a one-to-
one correspondence between the set of stable matchings and complete and closed subsets of the
rotation poset (R,⊲). Finding this poset (R,D) can be done in O(n3 · log(n)) time, where n
denotes the number of agents in the instance.
According to Lemma 1, to solve our problem, it suffices to search for a complete and closed
subset of rotations for the second input profile P2 such that the corresponding stable matching
is closest to M1.
4The singleton rotation is called singular rotation in [17, 25]; however, since we closely follow Gusfield [16],
we prefer to use the term singleton rotation. This is mainly to make it easier for the reader when referring to
lemmata of Gusfield.
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3.2 Proposal sets and rotation weights
In this section, we study the influence of a rotation elimination on the distance between the
ultimate resulting matching and the initial matching. In order to do so, we first define proposal
sets for preference tables and weights of rotations. Here, the weight of a rotation shall capture
how many pairs of the initial matching we can additionally obtain if we eliminate this rotation.
Then we study the properties of the thus introduced rotation weights. This is used later to
finish the sought reduction and to determine upper bounds on parameter values of the resulting
instance.
Imagine that in a preference table, every agent proposes to the first agent in their current
preference list. Then, we get a set of ordered pairs, where the agent indicated by the first
component of each pair proposes to the agent indicated by the second component in the pair.
Definition 5 (Proposal sets). For each preference table T , the proposal set for T is defined as
ST := {(i, j) | i ∈ U and j is the first agent on i’s list in T } ,
where (i, j) represents a proposal pair i→ j (i.e., agent i proposes to agent j).
For each matching M , the proposal set SM for M is defined as SM := {(i, j), (j, i) | {i, j} ∈
M}.
By the definition of proposal sets, for each matching M we have
dist(M1,M) = |M1∆M | = |M1|+ |M | − 2|M1 ∩M | = |M1|+ |M | − |SM1 ∩ SM | . (1)
Hence, we are looking for a matching M2 which is stable with respect to profile P2 such that
|SM1 ∩ SM2 | ≥ |M1|+ |M2| − k. (2)
Since every complete and closed rotation subset contains all singleton rotations and since all
singleton rotations can be eliminated from the table before all dual rotations [16], we can first
eliminate all singleton rotations. By Proposition 5, if after eliminating all singleton rotations,
some agent obtains an empty preference list, then we can immediately conclude that the given
profile does not admit any stable matching. Thus, in the following, we assume that there is no
singleton rotation in R.
To measure the benefit of eliminating a rotation, we define the following.
Definition 6 (Gain and lost proposal pairs after a rotation elimination). For each rotation ρ =
(e0, h0), (e1, h1), . . . , (er−1, hr−1) exposed in some table T , the set of proposal pairs gained (lost)
by eliminating rotation ρ is defined as follows.
S+ρ := {(e0, h1), (e1, h2), . . . , (er−1, h0)}, and S
−
ρ := {(e0, h0), (e1, h1), . . . , (er−1, hr−1)} .
Further, let w+(ρ) := |S+ρ ∩ SM1 | and w
−(ρ) = |S−ρ ∩ SM1 | be the number of desired proposal
pairs gained and lost by the elimination of rotation ρ.
Observe that the two sets S+ρ and S
−
ρ are independent of the table T and all of the proposal
pairs of agents not involved in the rotation ρ remain the same before and after the elimination
of ρ.
Since in order to obtain a stable matching, we have to eliminate exactly one rotation from
each dual pair of rotations, we now prove that their weights are complementary.
Lemma 2. Let ρ ∈ R be a dual rotation, then w+(ρ) = w−(¬ρ).
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Proof. Let ρ := (e0, h0), (e1, h1), . . . , (er−1, hr−1), and let S
+
ρ and S
−
ρ be the sets of proposal pairs
gained and lost by eliminating p, respectively. That is,
S+ρ ={(e0, h1), (e1, h2), . . . , (er−1, h0)}, and (3)
S−ρ ={(e0, h0), (e1, h1), . . . , (er−1, hr−1)}. (4)
By the definition of dual rotations, the dual of ρ is equal to ¬ρ = (h0, er−1), (h1, e0), . . . , (hr−1, er−2).
Accordingly, we have:
S+¬ρ ={(h0, e0), (h1, e1), . . . , (hr−1, er−1)}, and (5)
S−¬ρ ={(h0, er−1), (h1, e0), . . . , (hr−1, er−2)}. (6)
By (3) and (6), we can infer that
for each ordered pair (i, j) of agents it holds that (i, j) ∈ S+ρ if and only if (j, i) ∈ S
−
¬ρ. (7)
Since M1 is a matching, it follows that for each unordered pair {i, j} ∈ M1 of agents we have
that (i, j), (j, i) ∈ SM1 . Together with (7), we conclude that
for each ordered pair (i, j) of agents it holds that (i, j) ∈ S+ρ ∩ SM1 iff. (j, i) ∈ S
−
¬ρ ∩ SM1 .
Thus,
w+(ρ) = |S+ρ ∩ SM1 | = |S
−
¬p ∩ SM1 | = w
−(¬ρ).
3.3 Reduction to Weighted Conflict-Free Closed Subset
In this section we give a reduction from Incremental Stable Roommates to Weighted
Conflict-Free Closed Subset in which the conflict graph is a matching. In order to do so,
we show that the distance between the target (i.e., initial) matching M1 and a matching MC
resulting from the elimination of a complete and closed set C of rotations for P2 (if such sets
exist) depends only on
∑
ρ∈C w
−(ρ).
In the remainder of the section, let S0 be the proposal set for the Phase 1 table from P2 and
let R2 be the set of all dual rotations for P2; it is known that R2 has at most
(
n
2
)
rotations.
Lemma 3 ([16, Corollary 5.1]). |R2| ≤
(n
2
)
.
Upper-bounding the sum of weights of a complete and closed subset. Before we
continue with the procedure, we compare the sizes of MC and M1; recall that Mc is a matching
resulting from eliminating a complete and closed set C of rotations for P2. By Proposition 4,
every agent that has non-empty list after Phase 1 must be matched under MC and these agents
are exactly those agents who hold some proposals in S0. Consequently, for each agent x that is
matched under M1 but does not hold a proposal under S0 it holds that {x,M1(x)} ∈M1∆MC .
Thus, we define the following reduction rule.
Reduction Rule 1. For each agent xmatched underM1, if for each agent y it holds that (x, y) /∈ S0,
then delete {x,M1(x)} from M1 and decrease k by one.
Lemma 4. Rule 1 is sound and can be implemented in O(n2) time. Moreover, if Rule 1 does
not apply, then for each stable matching M of profile P2 it holds that |M1| ≤ |M | = |S0|/2.
Proof. Let x be as defined in the rule, i.e., x is matched under M1 but does not hold a proposal
in S0. For ease of notation, letM
−
1 :=M1\{{x,M1(x)}}. LetM be a stable matching for P2. By
Proposition 4, it follows that x is unmatched underM . Thus,M1∆M = (M∆M
−
1 )∪{x,M1(x)}.
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This implies that |M1∆M | ≤ k if and only if |M
−
1 ∆M | ≤ k− 1. The soundness of the reduction
rule follows.
As for the running time, for 2n agents in P2, in O(n
2) time we can complete Phase 1 and
obtain the proposal set S0 which has size at most 2n. Then, in O(n) time we can check for each
matched agent (under M1) whether it is “unmatched” in S0.
As for the second statement, it is immediate that |M1| ≤ |M |. Again, by Proposition 4, it
holds that |M | = |S0|/2. Hence, |M1| ≤ |M | = |S0|/2.
Next, we upper-bound the size of the intersection between the target (i.e., initial) matching
and the sought matching.
Lemma 5. Let C be a complete and closed subset of rotations in R2 and let MC be the stable
matching associated with C. Then, the following holds.
(i) |SM1 ∩ SMC | = |SM1 ∩ S0|+
∑
σ∈R2
w+(σ)− 2 ·
∑
ρ∈C w
−(ρ).
(ii) dist(M1,MC) ≤ k if and only if
∑
ρ∈C w
−(ρ) ≤
|SM1∩S0|+
∑
σ∈R2
w+(σ)−|M1|−|MC |+k
2 .
(iii) |SM1 ∩ S0|+
∑
σ∈R2
w+(σ)− |M1| − |MC | ≤ 0.
Proof. To show the first statement, let us first observe the following, which is similar to the case
in the marriage setting (see Lemma 8 and Corollary 1).
Claim 1. Let T be a preference table and ρ be a rotation exposed in T , and let T ′ be the
preference table obtained from T by eliminating ρ. Then, |SM1 ∩ ST ′ | = |SM1 ∩ ST | + w
+(ρ) −
w−(ρ).
Proof. The proof is similar to the one given for Lemma 8. Let ρ := ((e0, h0), · · · , (er−1, hr−1))
be a rotation exposed in the table T . In the following, all subscripts i + 1 are taken modulo r.
By the definition of T ′ and the definition of proposal sets we have that
ST ′ ={(x, y) ∈ ST | (x, y) /∈ ρ} ⊎ {(ei, hi+1) | 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1}
=(ST ∪ S
+
ρ ) \ S
−
ρ . (8)
Thus, we prove the statement in the claim by showing the following.
|SM1 ∩ ST ′ |
(8)
= |SM1 ∩
(
(ST ∪ S
+
ρ ) \ S
−
ρ
)
|
=|
(
(SM1 ∩ ST ) ∪ (SM1 ∩ S
+
ρ )
)
\ (SM1 ∩ S
−
ρ )|
=|(SM1 ∩ ST )|+ w
+
ρ − w
−
ρ .
The last equation holds because ST ∩ S
+
ρ = ∅ and S
−
ρ ⊆ ST and because of Definition 6.
(of Claim 1) ⋄
By applying the above repeatedly, we obtain the following for an (arbitrary) closed subset of
rotations.
Claim 2. If C ′ is a closed subset of rotations and T is the preference table obtained by elimi-
nating all rotations from C ′ on the Phase 1 table, then |SM1 ∩ST | = |SM1 ∩S0|+
∑
ρ∈C′ w
+(ρ)−∑
ρ∈C′ w
−(ρ).
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Now, we are ready to show our first statement. To this end, let C and MC be as defined in the
lemma. By Claim 2, it follows that
|SM1 ∩ SMC | =|SM1 ∩ S0|+
∑
ρ∈C
w+(ρ)−
∑
ρ∈C
w−(ρ)
=|SM1 ∩ S0|+
( ∑
σ∈R2
w+(σ)−
∑
σ∈R2\C
w+(σ)
)
−
∑
ρ∈C
w−(ρ)
Lemma 2
= |SM1 ∩ S0|+
( ∑
σ∈R2
w+(σ)−
∑
σ∈R2\C
w−(¬σ)
)
−
∑
ρ∈C
w−(ρ)
C is complete
= |SM1 ∩ S0|+
∑
σ∈R2
w+(ρ)− 2 ·
∑
ρ∈C
w−(ρ).
This completes the proof for the first statement.
The second statement follows directly from (1), (2), and the first statement.
As for the last statement, we first observe that for each two distinct rotations σ and σ′ from
R2 it holds that S
+
σ ∩ S
+
σ′ = ∅. To see this, let σ := ((e0, h0), . . . , (er−1, hr−1)) which is exposed
in some preference table T . Then, by definition, it holds that S+σ = {(ei, hi+1) | 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1}.
However, by [16, Lemma 5.1, Corollary 5.1], for each i ∈ {0, . . . , r−1}, no other other rotation ρ
exists such that (ei, hi+1) ∈ S
+
ρ .
Next, we observe that S0 ∩ S
+
σ = ∅. To see this, let σ := ((e0, h0), . . . , (er−1, hr−1)). Then,
S+σ = {(ei, hi+1) | 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1} (i + 1 are taken modulo r). By the definition of rotations, it
follows that ei prefers hi to hi+1, implying that hi+1 is not the first agent in the preference list
of ei right after Phase 1. That is, (ei, hi+1) /∈ S0. Thus, we have that
|SM1 ∩ S0|+
∑
σ∈R2
w+(σ) = |SM1 ∩ S0|+
∑
σ∈R2
|SM1 ∩ S
+
σ | =|SM1 ∩
(
S0 ∪
⋃
σ∈R2
S+σ
)
|
≤2 · |M1|. (9)
Now, to show the last statement, it suffices to show that |M1| ≤ |MC |. This is true by Lemma 4:
|SM1 ∩ S0|+
∑
σ∈R2
w+(σ) − |M1| − |MC |
(9)
≤ 2 · |M1| − |M1| − |MC |
Lemma 4
≤ 0.
Construction 1. Finally, we arrive at the following instance of Weighted Conflict-Free
Closed Subset:
(i) Apply Rule 1 in O(n2) time, and compute in O(n3 · log n) the rotation poset (R2,D)
for P2 (see Lemma 1).
(ii) Let R := R2 be the set of all dual rotations; note that |R2| ≤
(n
2
)
(Lemma 3),
(iii) Let G be a graph on R in which two elements of R are adjacent if they form a dual pair
of rotations (consequently, G is a union of ℓ = |R|/2 disjoint edges).
(iv) The weight function w is defined by w−.
(v) The budget b on the sum of weights is b :=
|SM1∩S0|+
∑
σ∈R2
w+(σ)−|M1|−|S0|/2+k
2 .
Note that b is derived from Lemma 5(ii) such that we are searching for a complete and closed
subset C of rotations whose sum of weights is bounded by b. To see this, since|SM | = |S0|/2
(Lemma 4), the budget b is in fact equal to
|SM1∩S0|+
∑
σ∈R2
w+(σ)−|M1|−|M |+k
2 , where M is an
arbitrary stable matching for P2. Thus, by Lemma 5(ii), by Lemma 5 the budget b is at most
k/2. Note also that the sum of the weights w−(ρ) is upper-bounded by n and thus the reduction
presented above is a polynomial (many to one) reduction.
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Solving Weighted Conflict-Free Closed Subset when the conflict graph consists of
ℓ disjoint cliques. Now, to prove Theorem 1, we only need to show the following; recall that
the budget b, as defined in the construction, is at most k/2.
Lemma 6. If G consists of exactly ℓ cliques, then Weighted Conflict-Free Closed Subset
can be solved in O((∆(G) + 1))b · |R|2) time.
Proof. We present an algorithm for the special case of Weighted Conflict-Free Closed
Subset when the conflict graph G is a union of exactly ℓ cliques (see Algorithm 1).
First we introduce some notation. For every element p ∈ R, let
T ↑p = {q ∈ R | q D p} and T
↓
p = {q ∈ R | pD q}
be the set of all predecessors and the set of all ancestors of p (including p itself). For a set
P ⊆ R we define T ↑P as the union
⋃
p∈P T
↑
p ; the set T
↓
P is defined analogously.
Before we continue with the proof, we observe the following.
Observation 1. Let S be a solution to Weighted Conflict-Free Closed Subset. If p ∈ S,
then T ↑p ⊆ S and T
↓
NG(p)
∩ S = ∅.
Proof. When p ∈ S, since S is closed, we get T ↑p ⊆ S. Now, due to the conflicts S ∩NG(p) = ∅
and consequently no element of T ↓NG(p) can be a part of S. (of Observation 1) ⋄
According to Observation 1, when we decide to include p into S, we have to also include
all elements in T ↑p into S and delete all elements in T
↑
p and T
↓
NG(p)
from R. We extend the
weight of a single element to the set T ⊆ R of elements in the natural way, that is, we set
w(T ) :=
∑
p∈T w(p).
To upper-bound the weights of the sets T ↑p from above, we present the following data reduc-
tion rules.
Reduction Rule 2. If w(T ↑p ) > b, then we delete T
↓
p from R.
Reduction Rule 3. If Rule 2 is not applicable and there exists a clique with exactly one vertex p,
then we add T ↑p to S and decrease b by its weight w(T
↑
p ).
Reduction Rule 4. Let K be a clique in G. If p ∈ T ↑K , then we add T
↑
p to S and decrease b by
its weight w(T ↑p ).
In fact it follows from the results of Gusfield [16] that Rule 4 is never used in any Weighted
Conflict-Free Closed Subset instance resulting from the construction we just defined.
Claim 3. Rules 2 to 4 are sound. Furthermore, Rules 2 to 4 can be implemented to run in
O(|R|2) time.
Proof. Note that we have to take at least one vertex from each clique in G into S since we are
about to take ℓ elements in total; thus, Rules 3 and 4 are sound. Clearly, no solution S can
contain any set T of weight w(T ) > b, yielding soundness of Rule 2.
Indeed, Rule 2 runs in O(R) time. As for Rules 3 and 4, we need to update T ↑q , T
↓
q and the
corresponding weights for every element q left in the (updated) set of rotations R. This can be
done in a straightforward way in O(|R|2) time. (of Claim 3) ⋄
We apply Rules 2 to 4 exhaustively. Now, we branch on a clique K with 0 < w(T ↑p ) ≤ b for
every p ∈ K since we have to add one element of K into any solution anyway. Note that in this
branching we omit those cliques K for which minp∈K w(T
↑
p ) = 0 holds. This procedure yields
a search tree of depth at most b with branching factor ∆(G) + 1. Suppose that there is a leaf
with nonnegative budget in which there is no clique left for branching. We claim that this is a
yes-instance. At this point any clique left in G contains at least one element p with w(T ↑p ) = 0;
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Algorithm 1:
1 FindS(R,G, b, ℓ)
2 if b < 0 then return No;
3 S ← ∅;
4 while ∃p ∈ R with w(T ↑p ) > b do delete T
↓
p from R and G ; ⊲ Rule 2
5 while ∃p ∈ R with p ∈ T ↑K for some clique K in G do ⊲ Rule 4
6 S ← S ∪ T ↑p ;
7 delete T ↑p from R and G ;
8 b← b− w(T ↑p ) ;
9 if G contains less than ℓ cliques then return No;
10 while G contains an isolated vertex p do ⊲ Rule 3
11 S ← S ∪ T ↑p ;
12 delete T ↑p from R and G ;
13 b← b− w(T ↑p ) ;
14 ℓ← ℓ− 1
15 while ∃K clique in G with w(T ↑p ) > 0 for all p ∈ K do
16 foreach p in K do
17 S′ ← FindS(R \
(
T ↑p ∪ T
↓
K−p
)
, G, b − w(T ↑p ), ℓ− 1) ;
18 if S′ 6= No and S ∪ T ↑p ∪ S′ is independent in G then return S ∪ T
↑
p ∪ S′;
19 return No ;
20 if ∃p ∈ R in clique K with w(T ↑p ) = 0 then return S∪
FindS(R \
(
T ↑p ∪ T
↓
K−p
)
, G, b, ℓ− 1); ⊲ R 6= ∅
21 return S ;
we select greedily these elements into the solution S. Observe that this gives a valid solution
since all of these sets are of total weight 0 (note that by including p in the solution all of the
weights can only decrease).
As for the claimed running time, recall that it is possible to update all of the sets T left for
branching in O(|R|2) time. Furthermore, Rules 3 and 4 are invoked O(b) times and Rule 2 at
most once.
We finally come to our main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1 . By Construction 1, in polynomial time, we construct an instance for
Weighted Conflict-Free Closed Subset where the budget b is upper-bounded by k/2
and the conflict graph consists of |R2|/2 edges (see the reasoning right after Construction 1).
By Lemma 6, we can solve this instance and thus our problem in O(2k · n4) time.
4 Hard cases of Incremental Stable Roommates
Throughout this section, we are using the following non-standard “incremental” (resp. “decre-
mental”) variants of the Independent Set (resp. Clique) problem to show parameterized
intractability.
Our first problem asks for an independent set of size h for some graph in the case when an
independent set of size h for the graph minus an edge is already known.
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Edge-Incremental Independent Set
Input: A graph G, a distinguished edge e∗ ∈ E(G), a positive integer h, and an
independent set S∗ of size h for G− e∗.
Question: Does there exist an independent set S of size h in G?
Our second problem asks for a clique with pendant edges of size h for some graph in the case
when a clique of size h with pendant edges for the graph with an additional edge is known. A
clique with pendant edges for a graph G is a subset V ′ ⊂ V (G) of vertices such that V ′ forms a
clique in G, i.e., each two vertices in V ′ are adjacent, and that each vertex in V ′ has at least one
neighbor outside V ′. The size of a clique with pendant edges is defined as the number of vertices
in the clique.
Edge-Decremental Clique with Pendant Edges
Input: A graph G = (V,E), a distinguished edge e∗ ∈ E(G), a positive integer h, and
a clique S∗ ⊆ V with pendant edges of size h for G.
Question: Is there a clique S ⊆ V with pendant edges of size h in G− e∗?
Lemma 7. Edge-Incremental Independent Set and Edge-Decremental Clique with
Pendant Edges are NP-hard and W[1]-hard with respect to h.
Proof. Note that W[1]-hardness under Turing-reductions is immediate for these problems and
the simple tricks used to show the following lemma are to obtain hardness also under many-one
reductions.
Edge-Incremental Independent Set. We give a reduction from Independent Set param-
eterized by the size h of the solution to Edge-Incremental Independent Set again with
parameter h. Let (Gˆ, h) be an instance of Independent Set. We construct graph G from
Gˆ = (V,E) as follows: We add a set S∗ of h new vertices and for each vertex v ∈ V and each
vertex s ∈ S∗ we add edge {v, s}. We finish the construction by picking two distinct vertices s
and s′ from S∗ and adding to E the edge e∗ = {s, s′}. Clearly, S∗ is an independent set of size
h in G− e∗ as required.
Observe that for each independent set S in G we either have S ⊆ V or S ⊆ S∗, since we
have added a complete bipartite graph between V and S. Now, since any independent set S
in G with S ⊆ S∗ contains at most h − 1 vertices, an independent set of size h in G can only
contain vertices from the set V , thus it must be an independent set of size h in the graph Gˆ.
Edge-Decremental Clique with Pendant Edges. Without loss of generality, we assume
that h > 2 and describe a straight-forward parameterized reduction from Edge-Incremental
Independent Set parameterized by the size h of the solution to Edge-Decremental Clique
with Pendant Edges with parameter h. Given the instance (G, e∗, S∗, h) of Edge-Incremental
Independent Set, we create the graph G′ by complementing the graph G− e∗ and adding for
each original vertex in v ∈ V (G′) a new vertex that is only connected to v. It is easy to verify
that (G′, e∗, S∗, h) is a yes-instance of Edge-Decremental Clique with Pendant Edges
if and only if (G, e∗, S∗, h) is a yes-instance of Edge-Incremental Independent Set. (The
newly added vertices ensure the existence of the pendant edges and can never be part of a clique
of size more than two.)
4.1 Incremental Stable Roommates is generally hard even without ties
To show that Incremental Stable Roommates without ties is NP-hard, we identify a re-
lation of our problem to an egalitarian variant of stable matching where the egalitarian cost
is minimized. Here, the egalitarian cost of a matching M is defined as the sum of the ranks
of the agents with respect to their partners, and the rank of an agent x with respect to its
partner M(y) is equal to the number agents that x prefer over y. Feder [11] showed that finding
a stable matching with minimum egalitarian cost is NP-hard for Stable Roommates, even for
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complete preferences without ties (see the work of Chen et al. [7] for fixed-parameter tractability
results on this problem).
The original hardness proof by Feder [11] is to reduce from Vertex Cover, which, given
an undirected graph G and an integer h′ ∈ N, asks whether G admits a vertex cover of size h′,
i.e., a size-h′ vertex subset of V ′ ⊆ V (G) such that each edge in E(G) is incident to at least one
vertex from V ′. The basic idea behind the reduction is that putting a vertex to the solution set
is equivalent to increasing the egalitarian cost by one. This correspondence can also be achieved
in Incremental Stable Roommates by choosing an initial matching M1 which is associated
to an empty vertex set, thus finding a stable matching M2 closest to M1 is equivalent to finding
a vertex cover of minimum size. Note that Vertex Cover and Independent Set are dual
to each other, i.e., a vertex subset V ′ is a vertex cover of size h′ if and only if V (G) \ V ′ is an
independent set of size |V (G)| −h′. Due to this and since Independent Set is W[1]-hard with
respect to |V |−h′, we will directly reduce from Independent Set, also showing parameterized
intractability for our problem.
Proposition 6. Incremental Stable Roommates is NP-hard and W[1]-hard with respect
to k′ = |M1 ∩M2| even if no ties are allowed.
Proof Sketch. We present a reduction from the Independent Set problem which is W[1]-hard
when parameterized by the solution size. Let G = (V,E) be a graph and h be the desired size
of the independent set.
Following essentially the construction of Feder [11], we create our instance of Incremental
Stable Roommates as follows. For each vertex vi ∈ V , we create four agents pi, p¯i, qi, q¯i. The
preferences of these agents in P2 are identical to the profile constructed by Feder [11]:
agent pi : p¯i ≻ [{pj | {pi, pj} ∈ E}] ≻ q¯i, agent p¯i : qi ≻ pi,
agent qi : q¯i ≻ p¯i, agent q¯i : pi ≻ qi.
The old profile P1 is defined as follows.
agent pi : p¯i ≻ q¯i ≻ [{pj | {pi, pj} ∈ E}], agent p¯i : qi ≻ pi,
agent qi : q¯i ≻ p¯i, agent q¯i : pi ≻ qi.
Following the proof of Feder [11] we can conclude that matching all pi with the q¯i and qi with
the p¯i is a stable matching for P1. In order to obtain a stable matching for P2, however, one
can only keep those pi matched with the q¯i that correspond to an independent set.
4.2 Ties in the preferences make Incremental Stable Marriage hard
We show that Incremental Stable Marriage becomes intractable when ties are allowed even
if the two preference profiles P1 and P2 are almost identical. The following result is achieved by
a parameterized reduction from Edge-Decremental Clique with Pendant Edges.
Theorem 2. Incremental Stable Marriage with incomplete lists and when ties are allowed
is W[1]-hard with respect to k, even if |P1 ⊕ P2| = 1.
Proof. We present a parameterized polynomial-time reduction from theW[1]-hard Edge-Decremental
Clique with Pendant Edges (see Lemma 7). Let (G = (V,E), e∗, S∗, h) be an instance of
Edge-Decremental Clique with Pendant Edges, where S∗ ⊆ V is a clique with pendant
edges of size h in G. We assume without loss of generality that |E| >
(h
2
)
+ h.
To identify each clique vertex with its pendant edge, we introduce the following notion. Let
C be a clique with pendant edges. By definition, each clique vertex from C has at least one
neighbor outside C. Thus, for each clique vertex v ∈ C, let w be an arbitrary but fixed neighbor
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of v outside C. We use penC(v) to denote the corresponding pendant edge {v,w}. Further, we
denote by pen(C) := {pen(v) | v ∈ C} the set of pendent edges of clique C.
In what follows, agent sets U and W will not have the same cardinality so that some agents
need to remain unmatched. Note that for incomplete preferences with ties, using standard
padding tricks, we can make U and W have the same carnality and simulate an agent being
unmatched by being matched with dummy agents. Since using dummy agents to “garbage
collect” the unmatched agents will increase the size of symmetric difference between our initial
matching and the sought matching, we need to make sure that the number of unmatched agents
is upper-bounded by a function in k.
Agents, preferences, and the symmetric difference bound k. In our Incremental
Stable Marriage instance, we will have one agent for each vertex from V and one agent for
each edge from E. For simplicity, we use the same symbols for vertices (edges) and the corre-
sponding agents. Further, we introduce three sets of auxiliary agents: X := {x1, . . . , x|V |−h},
Y := {y1, . . . , y|E|−(h2)−h−1
, y∗}, and Q := {q1, . . . , qt}, where t is an even number which is to be
determined later, and two special agents y† and e†.
We partition our agents such that U = V ∪ Y ∪ {e†} ∪ {q1, q3, . . . , qt−1} forms one part and
W = X ∪ E ∪ {y†} ∪ {q2, q4, . . . , qt} forms the other part. The preferences of the agents in
profile P1 are set as follows.
agent v ∈ V : ({e ∈ E | v ∈ e}) ≻ (X), agent x ∈ X : (V ) ≻ q1,
agent y ∈ Y \ {y∗} : (E), agent e ∈ E\{e∗} : Y ≻ ({u ∈ V | u ∈ e}),
The path agents:
agent q1 : (X) ≻ q2, agent qt : qt−1
For each i ∈ {2, . . . , t− 1} :
agent qi : qi−1 ≻ qi+1,
Finally, we list the preferences of the four special agents associated with the extra edge e∗ = {u∗, v∗}:
agent y∗ : y† ≻ E, agent e∗ : e† ≻ (Y ∪ {y∗}) ≻ ({u∗, v∗}),
agent e† : y† ≻ e∗, agent y† : e† ≻ y∗.
The only agent changing its mind in profile P2, compared to P1, is the agent y
† who switches
the relative order of the (only) two potential partners in its preference list. The preference list of
agent y† in P2 becomes y
∗ ≻ e†. We set the difference k between the two matchings M1 and M2
to k := h2+5h+4 and set t := 2 · ⌈k/2⌉+2, which is strictly larger than k. It remains to define
the matching M1 that is stable for profile P1 to complete the construction. Before we do this,
we sketch the idea of the construction.
Construction idea and the initial matching M1. Observe that |W | − |U | =
(h
2
)
agents
will remain unmatched. As already discussed at the beginning of the proof, we can introduce(h
2
)
dummy agents to “garbage collect” these unmatched agents. However, this will increase
our parameter k only by 2 ·
(h
2
)
. To convey the actual idea of the reduction, however, we omit
introducing these dummy agents.
Now, the idea of our construction is that the set ⊥(M1) of agents that are not matched by
our initial matching M1 corresponds to the set of edges of the clique S
∗ for G. Analogously, for
every stable matching M2 for P2 the set ⊥(M2) of agents that are not matched by M2 will have
to correspond to a set of edges of some clique S for G− e∗.
This can be formally captured as follows.
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M1 :
V \ S∗ X
S∗
Y \ {y∗}
E \ {e∗}
y∗ e∗
e† y†
q1 q2
...
...
...
...
qt−1 qt
M2 :
V \ S X
S
Y \ {y∗}
E \ {e∗}
y∗ e∗
e† y†
q1 q2
...
...
...
...
qt−1 qt
Figure 1: Illustration of the stable matching M1 for P1 and a desired stable matching M2 for
P2 (see Definition 7 and Definition 8). Observe that each agent from U is matched in both M1
and M2. The agents from S and from S
∗ \ S changed their partners. The agents from pen(S)
and from E \ (pen(S) ∪
(S
2
)
) \ (E \ (pen(S∗) ∪
(S∗
2
)
)) changed their partners.
Definition 7. We define the initial matching M1 as follows.
(i) Match agent e† with agent y†.
(ii) Match every clique vertex agent v ∈ S∗ with its pendant edge agent penS∗(v).
(iii) Match every non-clique vertex agent v ∈ V \ S∗ to an arbitrary but fixed agent from X.
(iv) Match every agent from Y with an arbitrary but fixed non-pendant and “non-clique” edge
agent e ∈ E \ (
(S∗
2
)
∪ pen(S∗)).
(v) For every odd number i ∈ {1, 3, . . . , t− 1}, match agent qi with agent qi+1.
This completes the construction which can be computed in polynomial time. The following
claim implies that M1 is stable for P1. It will be used later in the correctness proof.
Claim 4. The set of unmatched agents in M1 is
(
S∗
2
)
. Moreover, M1 is stable for P1.
Proof. The first statement follows from the fact that by Definition 7, every agent from U is
matched and by Definition 7(iv), exactly those edge agents which correspond to the edges from(
S∗
2
)
are unmatched under M1.
As for the second statement, suppose for the sake of contradiction, that {u,w} is a blocking
pair ofM1 with u ∈ U and w ∈W . Now, observe that each agent from S
∗∪(Y \{y∗})∪{e†} ⊆ U
already obtains its most preferred agent as a partner. Moreover, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , t/2}, the
path agent q2i−1 only prefers to an agent z to its assigned partner with z ∈ X ∪ {q2i′ | 1 ≤
i′ ≤ t/2}, but agent z already obtains its most preferred agent as a partner (either some vertex
agent or some path agent). It follows that u ∈ V \ S∗ or u = y∗. Since y∗ only prefers y† to its
partner but y† already obtains its most preferred agent as a partner, it follows that u ∈ V \ S∗,
i.e., u is some non-clique vertex agent. This implies that M1(v) ∈ X. By the preferences of
the agents from V and since M1(u) ∈ X, it follows that w is some edge agent such that u ∈ w.
Since u is not a clique vertex from S∗, it follows that w 6⊆
(S∗
2
)
, implying that w ∈ E \
(S∗
2
)
. If
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w ∈ E \ (
(
S∗
2
)
∪ pen(S∗)), i.e., it is also not a pendant edge of some clique vertex from S∗, then
it obtains a partner from Y and will not form with u a blocking pair because u is a vertex agent.
Thus, w must be a pendant edge agent from pen(S∗). In this case, w is matched to another
incident vertex agent which is different from u. However, since w considers both its incident
vertex agents as tied, it cannot form with u a blocking pair, a contradiction. (of Claim 4) ⋄
Correctness of the Construction. We show that there is a stable matchingM2 for profile P2
with |M1∆M2| ≤ k if and only if there is a clique C
′ with pendant edges of size h for G− e∗.
For the “only if” direction, let S be a clique with pendant edges penS of size h for G − e
∗.
For ease of notation let E(S) =
(S
2
)
∪ pen(S) and E(S∗) =
(S∗
2
)
∪ pen(S∗).
Definition 8. We construct the target matching M2 as follows.
(i) Match e† with e∗ and y∗ with y†.
(ii) Match each clique vertex v ∈ S with its pendant edge agent penS(v).
(iii) Match each non-clique vertex agent v ∈ V \ (S ∪S∗) with the partner M1(v) (note that this
partner is from X).
(iv) Match each remaining non-clique vertex agent v ∈ S∗ \ S with an arbitrary but fixed not-
yet-matched agent from X.
(v) For each y ∈ Y \ {y∗} with M1(y) ∈ E \ E(S), match y with M1(y); recall that M1(y) ∈
E \ E(S∗).
(vi) Match each remaining not-yet-matched agent y ∈ Y \ {y∗} with an arbitrary but fixed
not-yet-matched agent from E \ E(S).
(vii) For every odd number i ∈ {1, 3, . . . , t− 1}, match agent qi with agent qi+1.
We claim the following for matching M2.
Claim 5. The set of unmatched agents in M2 is
(S
2
)
. Moreover, M2 is stable for P2.
Proof. Since S is a clique with pendant edges for G − e∗, we can infer that e∗ /∈
(
S
2
)
∪ pen(S).
Thus,M2 is indeed a matching. Moreover, by the definition of M2 (see Definition 8(ii), (v), (vi))
and similarly to the proof for Claim 4, we can conclude that exactly those edge agents which
correspond to some edge from
(S
2
)
are unmatched under M2.
As for the stability proof, observe that y†’s most preferred agent in P2 is agent y
∗. Using a
proof similar to the one for Claim 4, we can conclude that M2 is stable for P2. (of Claim 5) ⋄
Now, we upper-bound the size |M1∆M2|.
Claim 6. It holds that |M1∆M2| ≤ k.
Proof. To prove this, note that we only need to count the number of agents from U who change
their partners because bothM1 andM2 match all agents from U and unmatch exactly
(h
2
)
agents
from E (see Claim 4 and Claim 5). Thus, |M1∆M2| ≤ 2 · |{u ∈ U |M1(u) 6=M2(u)}|. Between
M1 and M2, the following agents from U may have changed their partners.
(1) The clique vertex agents from S,
(2) the non-clique vertex agents from S∗ \ S,
(3) the agents y from Y \ {y∗} with M2(y) ∈
(
E \ E(S)
)
\
(
E \ E(S∗)
)
,
(4) the agents y∗, and e†.
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Before we continue with the bound, let us recall a property in set theory.
For each three sets A,B,C it holds that A \ (B \ C) = (A ∩ C) ∪ (A \B). (10)
Substituting A = E \ E(S), B = E, and C = E(S∗), we conclude the following for the set of
agents described in (3).
(E \ E(S)) \ (E \ E(S∗)) =
(
(E \E(S) ∩ E
)
∪
(
(E \E(S)) \ E
)
= (E \ E(S)) ∩ E(S∗) ⊆ E(S∗).
Summarizing, by the definition of E(S∗), the number of agents from U that changed their
partners is at most |S| + |S∗| + |
(
S∗
2
)
| + |pen(S∗)| + 2 = 3h +
(
h
2
)
+ 2. Thus, |M1∆M2| ≤
2 · (3h +
(h
2
)
+ 2) = h2 + 5h+ 4. (of Claim 6) ⋄
For the “if” direction, let M2 be an arbitrary stable matching for P2 with |M1∆M2| ≤ k.
Our correctness proof mainly relies on the following claim.
Claim 7. Let Z ⊆ V be the set of vertex agents that are not matched to X in M2 and let F =
E ∩ ⊥(M2) be the set of unmatched edge agents. The following holds.
(i) e∗ /∈ F .
(ii) |Z| = h.
(iii) F =
(Z
2
)
.
(iv) Every agent from Z is matched to an edge agent from E \
(Z
2
)
.
Proof. For the first statement, observe that by the preferences of the agents from {y∗, e†, y†, e∗}
in P2 and by the stability of M2 for P2 it must hold that M2(e
†) = e∗ and M2(y
†) = y∗. Thus,
e∗ is matched, implying that e∗ /∈ F .
For the second statement, note thatM2 must match every agent fromX to some agent from V
as otherwise there would be an agent x ∈ X with M2(x) = q1. Every stable matching, however,
that contains {x, q1}must also match q2i with q2i+1 for every number i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t/2 − 1}. The
symmetric difference between M1 and M2 is at least 2 · (t/2 − 1 + 1) = t > k—a contradiction.
Since |X| = |V | − h it follows that exactly h agents from V remain that are not matched to X.
By the definition of Z, we immediately have |Z| = h.
To show the third statement, first, we show that
F ⊆
(
Z
2
)
. (11)
Towards a contradiction, suppose that there is an edge e ∈ F \
(
Z
2
)
, i.e., there exists an unmatched
edge agent e ∈ F for which at least one of its endpoint is matched to X. Let v ∈ e be such an
incident vertex of e with M2(v) ∈ X. Note that by the first statement, we have that e 6= e
∗
since e is unmatched under M2. Now, we claim that M2 is not stable since {v, e} is a blocking
pair. Indeed, edge agent e is not matched and prefers to be matched with v and v finds e better
than its current partner (from X). Thus, M2 is not stable—a contradiction.
Second, we show that |F | ≥
(h
2
)
. To see this, observe that by the preferences of the agents
from E \ {e∗}, each edge agent from E \ {e∗} is either unmatched or matched to a vertex agent
from V or matched to an agent from Y \ {y∗}. Now, recall by the definition of Z that each
agent from V \ Z is matched to some agent from X. Thus, each edge agent from E \ {e∗} is
either unmatched or matched to an agent from Z ∪ Y ∪ {y∗}. By the definition of F and since
M2(e
∗) = e†, it follows that
|F | ≥ |E \ {e∗}| − |Z ∪ (Y \ {y∗})| = |E| − 1− (h+ |E| −
(
h
2
)
− h− 1) =
(
h
2
)
.
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The second to last equation holds because |Z| = h (see the second statement). Together with
(11), we infer that |F | =
(h
2
)
and thus F =
(Z
2
)
.
Finally, to show the last statement, consider an arbitrary agent z ∈ Z. By the definition of
Z, it follows that z is either unmatched or matched to some agent from E \F . By the definition
of F and by the third statement, there exists an unmatched edge agent e ∈ F which is incident
to z. By the stability of M2 it must hold that z is matched to some edge agent from E \ F , i.e.,
from E \
(Z
2
)
. (of Claim 7) ⋄
We construct our clique S with pendant edges penS of size h for G− e
∗ by applying Claim 7
as follows. The clique is set to S := Z and for each vertex v ∈ S we set its pendant edge penS(v)
to M2(v). Note that by Claim 7(i) it holds that e
∗ /∈ F . Together with and Claim 7(iii) we infer
that |{u∗, v∗} ∩ Z| ≤ 1 and, hence, Z is indeed a clique in G − e∗. By Claim 7(iv), the defined
pendant edges are all from G− e∗.
In the following, we show that with respect to the number of common pairs between the target
stable matching and the initial stable matching the problem is parameterized intractable, even
if the two input profiles differ by only two swaps. The corresponding parameterized reduction
is from Independent Set.
Theorem 3. Parameterized by the number k′ = |M1 ∩M2| of common pairs, Incremental
Stable Marriage with ties is W[1]-hard, even if |P1 ⊕ P2| = 2.
Proof. We show this by reducing from theW[1]-hard Independent Set problem, parameterized
by the solution size. The parameterized Independent Set problem has, as input, an undirected
graph G and an integer h ∈ N–the parameter–and asks whether G admits an independent set of
size h, i.e. an h-vertex subset of V ′ ⊆ V (G) of pairwise nonadjacent vertices. Let I = (G,h) be
an instance of Independent Set. Further, let V (G) = {v1, . . . , vn} and E(G) = {e0, . . . , em−1}
denote the set of vertices and the set of edges in G respectively; note that we start the index
of the edges with zero to simplify our reasoning later. We construct an instance (P1, P2,M1) of
Incremental Stable Marriage with ties, where the two profiles P1 and P2 are preference
profiles for two disjoint sets of agents, U ∪W ∪E ∪F ∪A∪B and X ∪ Y ∪H ∪C ∪D, and the
matching M1 is stable for P1 such that P1 and P2 will differ from each other by only two swaps.
We will be searching for stable matching M2 for P2 with |M1 ∩M2| ≥ 2h.
The agent sets. For each vertex vi ∈ V (G), we introduce four agents ui, wi, xi, yi, and add
them to U , W , X, Y , respectively.
For each edge eℓ ∈ E(G) with two endpoints vi and vj , do the following. Introduce four
agents eℓ, fℓ, h
ui
ℓ , and h
uj
ℓ . Add eℓ to E, fℓ to F , and h
ui
ℓ as well as h
uj
ℓ to H. Additionally,
introduce the auxiliary agents aℓ, bℓ, cℓ, and dℓ, and add them to A, B, C, and D, respectively.
The preference lists of the agents from U , W , X, and Y . The preference lists of these
agents are the same in both P1 and P2, and are constructed in such a way that an arbitrary
stable matching must match these agents among themselves. Here, [⋆] means that the elements
in ⋆ are ranked in an arbitrary but fixed order, while (⋆) means that the elements in ⋆ are tied.
∀i ∈ [n], ui : xi ≻ [{h
ui
ℓ | eℓ ∈ E(G) with vi ∈ eℓ}] ≻ yi, xi : wi ≻ ui,
wi : yi ≻ xi yi : ui ≻ wi.
The preference lists of the agents from E, F , and H. The preference lists of these agents
are the same in both P1 and P2.
∀eℓ ∈ E[G] with eℓ = {vi, vj} and i < j, eℓ : (h
ui
ℓ , h
uj
ℓ ) ≻ cℓ, h
ui
ℓ : (eℓ, ui, aℓ) ≻ fℓ,
fℓ : (h
ui
ℓ , h
uj
ℓ ) ≻ dℓ, h
uj
ℓ : (eℓ, uj , bℓ) ≻ fℓ.
21
The preference lists of the auxiliary agents from A, B, C, and D. Except for the agents
c0 and d0, the preference lists of these agents are the same in both P1 and P2. We first describe
the preference lists of all the auxiliary agents in P1, and then only describe the preference lists
of c0 and d0 in P2 as the other will remain the same. The operations “ℓ + 1” and “ℓ − 1” are
taken modulo m.
∀eℓ ∈ E[G] with eℓ = {vi, vj} and i < j, aℓ : cℓ+1 ≻ h
ui
ℓ , cℓ : (aℓ−1, eℓ),
bℓ : dℓ+1 ≻ h
uj
ℓ , dℓ : (bℓ−1, fℓ).
In P2, the preference lists of agents c0 and d0 will be changed so that the acceptable agents are
not tied any more:
c0 : am−1 ≻ e0, and d0 : bm−1 ≻ f0.
It is straight-forward to verify that P1 and P2 differ by only two swaps.
The initial stable matching M1 of P1. For each vertex vi ∈ V (G), let M1(ui) = yi,
M1(wi) = xi. For each edge eℓ ∈ E(G) with eℓ = {vi, vj} and i < j, letM1(eℓ) = cℓ,M1(fℓ) = dℓ,
M1(aℓ) = h
ui
ℓ , and M1(bℓ) = h
uj
ℓ . One can verify that this matching is indeed a stable matching
of P1.
As already mentioned, we set the minimum number of common pairs between M1 and the
target matching M2 (which shall be stable in P2) to be 2h. This completes the construction.
The following figure depicts a portion of acceptability graph of profile P1, where the labels
on the edges denote the ranks of the agents. The edges marked with gray colors are part of
matching M1.
e0
f0
c0
d0
am−1
bm−1
h
uim−1
m−1
uim−1
h
ujm−1
m−1
ujm−1
em−1
fm−1
cm−1
dm−1
am−2
bm−2
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
02
02
02
02
1 0
1 0
0
1
0
1
0 0
3
00
0
3 0
Before we show that this is parameterized reduction, we observe the following.
Claim 8. Every stable matching M of P2 satisfies the following.
1. For each vertex vi ∈ V (G), we have that {M(ui),M(wi)} = {xi, yi}.
2. For each edge eℓ ∈ E(G), agents cℓ and dℓ must be assigned some partners under M .
3. For each edge eℓ ∈ E(G) with eℓ = {vi, vj}, we have that M(cℓ) = aℓ−1, M(dℓ) = bℓ−1,
and {M(huiℓ−1),M(h
uj
ℓ−1)} = {eℓ−1, fℓ−1}.
4. For each vertex vi ∈ V (G) and each edge eℓ ∈ E(G) with vi ∈ eℓ, if M(ui) = yi, then
M(huiℓ ) = eℓ.
Proof. For the first statement, suppose, towards a contradiction, that there exists some vertex vi
such that {M(ui),M(wi)} 6= {xi, yi}. By the preference lists of xi and yi, it follows that xi or
yi is not assigned a partner by M . If agent xi was not assigned a partner, then it will form with
wi a blocking pair of M as xi is the only agent which wi prefers most. Analogously, if agent yi
was not assigned a partner, then it will form with ui a blocking pair of M .
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For the second statement, observe that aℓ−1 ranks cℓ at the first place. If agent cℓ−1 would
have been unmatched under M , then it would form with aℓ−1 a blocking pair. Analogously, we
can obtain that dℓ−1 must also be assigned a partner.
For the third statement, observe that in P2, agents c0 and am−1 form a fixed pair, meaning
that they prefer each other more than any other agents. Thus, agents c0 and am−1 must be
matched with each other in any stable matching of P2. Analogously, agents d0 and bm−1 must
be matched with each other in any stable matching of P2.
Now, let vim−1 and vjm−1 be the two endpoints of edge em−1. By the preference lists of em−1
and fm−1, we know that h
uim−1
m−1 and h
ujm−1
m−1 must be assigned some partners as otherwise the
one that is unmatched (under M) will form with em−1 and fm−1 two blocking pairs of M . By
the first statement we have that M(uim−1) ∈ {xim−1 , yim−1} and since am−1 is already matched
to c0, agent h
uim−1
m−1 can only be matched to an agent that is either em−1 or fm−1. Analogously,
agent h
ujm−1
m−1 can only be matched to an agent that is either em−1 or fm−1.
We have just reasoned that the partners of em−1 and fm−1 underM are from {h
uim−1
m−1 , h
ujm−1
m−1 }.
By the preference lists of cm−1 and dm−1, using the second statement, we conclude thatM(cm−1) =
am−2 andM(dm−1) = bm−2. By a similar reasoning as we did for am−1 and bm−1, we can achieve
our desired third statement.
For the fourth statement, assume that M(ui) = yi. Since ui prefers h
ui
ℓ to its partner yi, by
the stability of M , it follows that huiℓ must find its partner M(h
ui
ℓ ) at least as good as ui. This
means that M(huiℓ ) 6= fℓ. By the third statement, it follows that M(h
ui
ℓ ) = eℓ. (of Claim 8) ⋄
Now, we are ready to show the correctness of the construction, i.e. I admits an independent
set of size h if and only if P2 admits a stable matchingM2 with |M1∩M2| ≥ 2h. For the “only if”
direction, assume that V ′ is an independent set of G with h vertices. We construct matchingM2
as follows.
1. For each vertex vi ∈ V , if vi /∈ V
′ is not from the independent set, then let M2(ui) = xi
and M2(wi) = yi; otherwise let M2(ui) =M1(ui) = yi and M2(wi) =M1(wi) = xi.
2. For each edge eℓ ∈ E(G), let vi and vj denote the endpoints of eℓ with i < j. If vj ∈ V
′ is
from the independent set, implying that vi /∈ V
′, then let M2(eℓ) = h
uj
ℓ and M2(fℓ) = h
ui
ℓ .
Otherwise, let M2(eℓ) = h
ui
ℓ and M2(fℓ) = h
uj
ℓ . Let M2(aℓ) = cℓ+1 and M2(bℓ) = dℓ+1.
It is straight-forward to verify that |M1∩M2| = 2h as they share at the pairs that correspond
to the vertices in the independent set. Now, we focus on the stability of M2. Towards a
contradiction, suppose that M2 is not stable in P2, and let p be a blocking pair of M2. This
pair p must involve some agent from U ∪W ∪ E ∪ F ∪A ∪B.
First of all, one can verify that no agent wi from W would be involved in a blocking pair
because xi is the only agent with which wi could form a blocking pair, but xi will already
obtain its most preferred agent yi. Further, no agent from E ∪ F ∪ A ∪ B would be involved
in a blocking pair as they already received one their most preferred agents. Thus, we obtain
that p involves some agent from U , say uz. We know that M2(uz) = yz as otherwise we have
that M2(uz) = xz which is uz’s most preferred agent–a contradiction to uz being in blocking
pair p. By our definition of M2, it follows that vz ∈ V
′ is from the independent set. Hence, the
other agent in blocking pair p must be some agent huzℓ with vz ∈ eℓ such that h
uz
ℓ prefers uz to
M2(h
uz
ℓ ). By the preference list of h
uz
ℓ it follows that M2(h
uz
ℓ ) = fℓ as otherwise h
uz
ℓ will not
form with uz a blocking pair. Let vz′ be the other endpoint of eℓ, implying that vz′ /∈ V
′. If
z < z′, then by our definition of M2, it follows that M2(h
uz
ℓ ) = eℓ–a contradiction. If z
′ < z,
then by our definition of M2, it also follows that M2(h
uz
ℓ ) = eℓ–a contradiction. This shows that
M2 is indeed a stable matching of P2 which shares with M1 by 2h pairs.
For the other direction, assume that M2 is a stable matching of P2, sharing with M1 by at
least 2h pairs. By the third statement in Claim 8, it follows that M2 can only share with M1
23
v1
v2
v3 v4
G :
(a) The graph of an Edge-Incremental Inde-
pendent Set instance (G, e∗ = {v3, v4}, h =
2, S∗ = {v3, v4}). The instance is a yes-instance:
The graphG admits an independent set {v1, v4}
of size two, marked in light green.
v1
v2
v3 v4
x2 y2
z2
x1 y1
z1
c1
c2
(b) The acceptability graph of the correspond-
ing Incremental Stable Roommates in-
stance (for both P1 and P2). Profile P2 admits
a stable matching, marked by the thick dotted
green lines.
Figure 2: An illustration of the hardness reduction for Theorem 4.
by the pairs that involve some agents from U ∪W ∪X ∪ Y . Now we construct a vertex subset
according to these pairs. Let V ′ = {vi ∈ V | M2(ui) = yi}. Clearly, using the first statement
in Claim 8, we have that |V ′| ≥ h as |M1 ∩ M2| ≥ 2h. Now, to show that V
′ is indeed an
independent set, suppose, towards a contradiction, that V ′ has two adjacent vertices, denoted
as vi and vj . Let eℓ be the incident edge of vi and vj . By the fourth statement of Claim 8 we
have that M2(h
ui
ℓ ) = eℓ =M2(h
uj
ℓ )–a contradiction to M2 being a matching.
Finally, we show that even a single swap in the preference list of one single agent makes the
Incremental Stable Roommates problem W[1]-hard with respect to k when ties are allowed.
To show this result, we give a reduction from Edge-Incremental Independent Set. The
construction idea is inspired by a reduction from Vertex Cover to Stable Roommates with
structured preferences [5], which, however, is relying on incomplete preferences and not showing
parameterized intractability.
Theorem 4. For complete preferences with ties, Incremental Stable Roommates is W[1]-
hard with respect to k, even if |P1 ⊕ P2| = 1. It remains NP-hard even if the sought stable
matching M2 only needs to satisfy that |M1 ∩M2| ≥ 0, even if |P1 ⊕P2| = 1.
Proof. Let (G = (V,E), e∗ ∈ E, h, S∗ ⊆ V ) be an Edge-Incremental Independent Set
instance with r := |V | vertices. We assume w.l.o.g. that h < r, S∗ = {vr−h+1, . . . , vr}. Moreover,
we assume that e∗ ⊆ S∗ (as otherwise the input instance is a trivial yes-instance) with e∗ =
{vr−1, vr}. We construct an Incremental Stable Roommates instance (P1,P2,M1) with
agent set U and |P1 ⊕ P2| = 1. We will show that G has an independent of size at least h if and
only if P2 admits a stable matching M2 with |M1 ⊕M2| ≤ 4h.
Before we describe the construction, we prove the following claim which is heavily used in
our preference profile construction to force two agents to be matched together.
Claim 9. Let P be a profile for an agent set U , and let x, y, and z be three distinct agents with
the following preference lists,
agent x : V ≻ y ≻ z ≻ . . . ,
agent y : z ≻ x ≻ . . . ,
agent z : x ≻ y ≻ . . . ,
where V ⊆ U \ {x, y, z} is a non-empty subset of agents, The symbol “. . .” at the preference
list of each agent a denotes an arbitrary but fixed order of all remaining agents, other than a
and not explicitly stated before “. . .”: Then, every stable matching M for P must fulfill that (i)
M(x) ∈ V and (ii) {y, z} ∈M .
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction to (i) that P admits a stable matchingM withM(x) /∈ V .
There are three cases: (1) M(x) = y, implying the blocking pair {y, z}, (2) M(x) = z, implying
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the blocking pair {x, y}, and (3) M(x) /∈ {y, z} ∪ V , implying the blocking pair {x, z}. Thus,
x must be matched with some agent from V . For (ii), statement (i) implies that neither y nor
z is matched with x. Now, if {y, z} /∈M , then {y, z} forms a blocking pair. (of Claim 9) ⋄
Main idea and the constructed agents. To explain the main idea of the reduction, we
first describe the agent set U and the corresponding non-complete acceptability graph of P as
illustrated through an example in Figure 2. At the end of the proof, we show that we can adjust
the reduction so that the acceptability graph becomes complete.
For each vertex vi ∈ V , we introduce a vertex agent vi (for the sake of simplicity, we use
the same symbol for the vertex and the corresponding agent). Additionally, there is a set of
cover agents C := {c1, . . . , cr−h} as well as three sets of selector agents X := {x1, x2, . . . , xh},
Y := {y1, y2, . . . , yh}, and Z := {z1, z2, . . . , zh}. The agent set U is defined as V ∪C ∪X ∪Y ∪Z.
For the acceptability graph, we have that every vertex agent vi accepts every cover agent from C,
every selector agent from X, and every vertex agent vj that corresponds to a neighbor of vi in
the input graph G. For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h}, the collector agents xi, yi, and zi pairwisely accept
each other.
Using Claim 9 we construct the preference profile P2 of the agents such that in every stable
matching only the cover agents from C and the selector agents from X can be matched to the
vertex agents and the vertex agents matched to the selector agents from X correspond to an
independent set (of size |X| = h). These properties are given by the subsequent Claim 11.
Agent preferences in P1 and P2. First, we describe the preferences profiles P2 that realize
the idea and the acceptability graph as described above.
P2: agent vi : [C] ≻ [N(vi)] ≻ x1 ≻ x2 ≻ · · · ≻ xh ≻ . . . , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1,
agent vr : [C] ≻ [N(vi) \ {vr−1}] ≻ vr−1 ≻ x1 ≻ x2 ≻ · · · ≻ xh ≻ . . . ,
agent ci : v1 ∼ v2 ∼ · · · ∼ vr ≻ . . . , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ r − h,
agent xi : v1 ∼ v2 ∼ · · · ∼ vr ≻ yi ≻ zi ≻ . . . , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ h,
agent yi : zi ≻ xi ≻ . . . , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ h,
agent zi : xi ≻ yi ≻ . . . , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ h.
With a single swap in the preference list of agent vr, we obtain the profile P1:
P1: agent vi : [C] ≻ [N(vi)] ≻ x1 ≻ x2 ≻ . . . ≻ xh ≻ . . . , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1,
agent vr : [C] ≻ [N(vi) \ {vr−1}] ≻ x1 ≻ vr−1 ≻ x2 ≻ · · · ≻ xh ≻ . . . ,
agent ci : v1 ∼ v2 ∼ · · · ∼ vr ≻ . . . , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ r − h,
agent xi : v1 ∼ v2 ∼ · · · ∼ vr ≻ yi ≻ zi ≻ . . . , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ h,
agent yi : zi ≻ xi ≻ . . . , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ h,
agent zi : xi ≻ yi ≻ . . . , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ h.
Herein, for each agent subset D, we denote by [D] the lexicographic order of the agents by their
names (resp. by their indices), called the canonical order. The symbol “. . .” at the preference
list of each agent a denotes an arbitrary but fixed order of all remaining agents, other than a
and not explicitly stated before “. . .”:
Stable matching M1 for P1. The initial matching M1 is defined as follows:
• for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h} set M(vr−i+1) := xi;
• for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r − h} set M(vi) = ci;
• for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h} set M(yi) = zi.
This completes the construction and can clearly be performed in polynomial time.
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Correctness of the construction. First of all, we claim that in the constructed Incremen-
tal Stable Roommates instance M1 is indeed a stable matching for P1.
Claim 10. The matching M1 is a stable matching for the profile P1.
Proof of Claim 10. First, observe that, by definition of M1, no agent from C or X can be
involved in a blocking pair, since they all are matched to one of their (tied) favorite partners.
Second, since the agents from X are not available also the agents from Y and from Z cannot be
involved in blocking pairs. Finally, a blocking pair that consist of two agents from V (the last
possibility for a blocking pair to emerge) would mean that we have two agents vr−i+1i and vr−j+1
(1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ h) that are both matched to some agent from X. Furthermore, in order to be a
blocking pair both agents must be adjacent in G because only agents corresponding to neighbors
in G are preferred to agents from X. Since the vertices vr−h+1, . . . , vr are an independent set in
G− e∗ for e∗ = {vr−1, vr}, only {vr−1, vr} could be a blocking pair. However, {vr−1, vr} is also
not blocking M1 because (due to the swap of x1 and vr−1 in the preferences of vr between P2
and P1) agent vr prefers its partner M1(vr) = x1 over vr−1. (of Claim 10) ⋄
Second, we claim the following:
Claim 11. Every stable matching M ′2 for P2 satisfies the following two properties:
1. every vertex agent vi is matched to either a cover agent from C or a selector agent from X,
that is, M(vi) ∈ C ∪X for every v ∈ V , and
2. no two vertex agents that are both matched to the selector agents are adjacent in G.
Proof of Claim 11. Let M ′2 be a stable matching for P. For the first statement, observe Claim 9
immediately implies that for every selector agent xi ∈ X, it holds that M(xi) ∈ V . Thus, there
are exactly r − h vertex agents left that are not matched to agents from X. Suppose towards a
contradiction that some cover agent cj is not matched to any vertex agent, implying that at least
one vertex agent vi is left with M(vi) /∈ X ∪C. This, however, implies that {cj , vi} is a blocking
pair for M ′2—a contradiction. For the second statement, suppose towards a contradiction that
there are two vertex agents vi, vj with {M(vi),M(vj)} ⊆ X as well as {vi, vj} ∈ E. The
preference lists of vi and vj immediately imply that agents vi and vj form a blocking pair—a
contradiction. (of Claim 11) ⋄
Now, we show that G has an independent set of size at least h if and only if P2 admits a
stable matching M2 with |M1 ⊕M2| ≤ 4h.
The “if” part follows immediately from Claim 11 because it directly implies that the vertices
corresponding to the h vertex agents matched to selector agents from X are pairwisely non-
adjacent in the graph G.
For the “only if” part, assume that S ⊆ V be an independent set of size h for G. Let S :=
{vs1 , vs2 , . . . , vsh} with s1 < s2 < · · · < sh such that the canonical order ≻ implies vs1 ≻ vs2 ≻
· · · ≻ vsh . We construct a matching M2 (based on M1) such that |M1 ⊕M2| ≤ 4h and such that
M2 is stable for P2. First, we match all selector agents and the vertex agents corresponding to
the independent set S:
• for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h} set M2(yi) := zi(=M1(yi));
• for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h} set M2(vsi) := xi.
So far, at most 2h agents have different partners in M1 and M2. At least r − 2h vertices are
neither in the independent set S for G nor in the independent set S∗ = {vr−h+1, . . . , vr} for
G− e∗. We keep the partners for the corresponding vertex agents unchanged:
• for each v ∈ V \ (S ∪ S∗) set M2(v) :=M1(v).
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Finally, some number q ≤ h of vertex agents, namely those corresponding to vertices from S∗ \S,
are so far unmatched in M2. Symmetrically, also q ≤ h cover agents, namely those cover agents
that where matched to vertex agents from S∗ \ S in M1, are also so far unmatched in M2. We
pair these agents arbitrarily such that each vertex agent is matched to a cover agent to finalize
the definition of M2 so far. Doing this, at most 2q ≤ 2h agents will get different partners in M2
when compared with M1. Hence, |M1∆M2| ≤ 4h.
It remains to show that M2 is stable. This can be done analogously to the proof of Claim 10.
First, observe that, by the definition of M2, no agent from C or X can be involved in a blocking
pair since they all are matched to one of their (tied) favorite partners. Second, since agents
from X are not available, the agents from Y and from Z cannot be involved in blocking pairs.
Finally, a blocking pair that consist of two agents from V (the last possibility for a blocking
pair to emerge) would mean that we have two agents vi and vj that are both matched to some
agent from X. Furthermore, in order to be a blocking pair both agents must be adjacent in G
because only agents corresponding to neighbors in G are preferred to agents from X. This is a
contradiction to our definition of M2, where the h agents from X have been matched to h vertex
agents corresponding to the independent set S.
Unbounded k. Note that in this proof, we never used an explicit bound on the parameter k
for any proof argument to work. In particular, if there is any stable matching for P2, then
there is one with distance |M1 ⊕M2| ≤ 4h (this follows from Claim 11 and from the idea given
in the “only if” part). In particular, the problem remains NP-hard if we set k = 2n, that is,
k′ = 2n − k = 0. In other words, the problem remains hard even if the distance between the
matchings M1 and M2 is unbounded.
5 Conclusion
Motivated by dynamically changing preferences and the necessity to adapt the corresponding
solutions, we introduced an “incremental view” on the computation of stable matchings. We
believe that there are plenty of opportunities for future research, including, for instance, to
study the role of parameters measuring the number of ties—in many hardness reductions this
parameter was unbounded. We also left open whether Incremental Stable Roommates
without ties is fixed-parameter tractable when parameterized by the swap distance between
the two input preference profiles. Naturally, there are also future directions concerning more
conceptual work, e.g. also studying further stability concepts in the context of our incremental
model.
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A Incremental Stable Marriage without ties
In this section, we show that Incremental Stable Marriage without ties can be solved
in polynomial time, using an idea similar to the one for finding the so-called maximum weight
stable matching, a stable matching whose corresponding closed subset of rotations have maximum
weight [17, Chapter 3.6.2]; the concept revolving around the rotations will be defined shortly.
Gusfield and Irving [17] presented a network flow approach to find such a maximum-weight
stable matching in O(n2 · w) time, where n and w denote the number of agents and the sum
of weights of rotations, respectively. We will show that for our problem the sum of the weights
of rotations is bounded by n, which is the size of the intersection between our sought stable
matching and the target stable matching.
In the remainder of the section, we present necessary notions and the definition of the weights
of the rotations and refer to Chapter 3.6.1 by Gusfield and Irving for further details.
A.1 Preliminaries
The approach will heavily utilize the structural properties revolving around stable matchings
and rotations of a Stable Marriage instance without ties.
As already observed in the literature, for each Stable Marriage instance P with two
disjoint sets U andW of agents, when operating on the agent set U , the Gale-Shapely algorithm
always returns a U -optimal stable matching M . The matching M is U -optimal stable matching
if it is stable and there is no other stable matching M ′ such that an agent from U would prefer
its partner from M to the partner from M ′. Starting from the U -optimal stable matching, we
can successively eliminate the so-called rotations to obtain further stable matchings.
Definition 9 (Successor agent, rotations, and rotation elimination). Let P be a Stable Mar-
riage instance with two disjoint sets of agents, U and W , and with (possibly) incomplete prefer-
ences. Given a stable matching M for P , for each agent u ∈ U , we define its successor succM (u)
as the first (after M(u)) agent w on the preference list of u such that w is matched under M
and prefers u to its partner M(w).
A sequence ρ = ((u0, w0), (u1, w1), . . . , (ur−1, wr−1)) of pairs is called a rotation if there exists
a stable matching M for P such that for each i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r − 1} we have (ui, wi) ∈ U ×W ,
M(ui) = wi, and succM (ui) = wi+1 (index i + 1 taken modulo r). We say that rotation ρ is
exposed in M .
We use the notation M/ρ to refer to the matching resulting from M by replacing each
pair {ui, wi} with {ui, wi+1}. Formally,
M/ρ =M \ {{ui, wi} | 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1} ∪ {{ui, wi+1} | 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1}.
The transformation of M to M/ρ is called the elimination of ρ from M .
We illustrate the concept of the successor below:
u : . . .M(u) . . . succM (u) . . . , succM (u) : . . . u . . .M(succM (u)) . . .
Eliminating a rotation from a stable matching results in another stable matching [17, Lemma
2.5.2].
Definition 10 (Predecessors of rotations, the rotation poset, and the rotation digraph). Let π
and ρ be two rotations for a Stable Marriage instance P . We say that π is a predecessor
of ρ, written as π ⊲P ρ, if no stable matching in which ρ is exposed can be obtained from the
U -optimal stable matching by a sequence of eliminations of rotations without eliminating π first.
The reflexive closure of the relation ⊲P , denoted as DP , defines a partial order on the set of all
rotations and is called the rotation poset for P . We abbreviate the name of a subset of the poset
that is closed under predecessors as a closed subset.
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An alternative representation of the rotation poset D(P ) is through an acyclic directed graph,
called rotation digraph of P and written as G(P ), whose vertex set is the set of rotations of P ,
and there is a direct arc from rotation π to rotation ρ if and only if π precedes ρ and there is no
other rotation σ such that π ⊲P σ ⊲P ρ.
Finally, let us describe a central result from the literature that relates rotations and stable
matchings.
Proposition 7 ([17, Theorem 2.5.7, Lemma 3.3.2]). Let R denote the set of all rotations of a
preference profile P , and let G(P ) denote the rotation digraph of P . The following holds.
1. A matching M is a stable matching of P if and only if there is a closed subset of rota-
tions R′ ⊆ R with respect to the precedence relation ⊲P such that M can be generated by
taking the U -optimal stable matching and by eliminating the rotations in R′ in an order
consistent with ⊲P .
2. The rotation set R and the rotation digraph G(P ) can be computed in O(n2) time.
A.2 From Incremental Stable Marriage to Finding Maximum-Weight Closed
Subset of Rotations
Given an instance I = (P1,P2,M1, k) of Incremental Stable Marriage, let M0 be the
U -optimal stable matching of P2, let R2 denote the set of rotations for P2, and let G2 be the
rotation digraph for P2. Towards finding a stable matching which shall be as close to the input
matching M1 as possible, we assign a weight to each rotation from R2 which shall indicate the
benefit of eliminating this rotation.
For each rotation ρ ∈ R2 with ρ = ((x0, y0), · · · , (xr−1, yr−1)) let
w(ρ) := |{(xi, yi+1) | {xi, yi+1} ∈M1, 0 ≤ i ≤ r−1}}|−|{(xi, yi) | {{xi, yi} ∈M1, 0 ≤ i ≤ r−1}|.
That is, we count the number of pairs in M1 the elimination of ρ introduces minus the number
of pairs in M1 we loose when eliminating ρ. By the above definition, we can derive the following.
Lemma 8. If ρ ∈ R2 is a rotation exposed in a stable matching M for P2, then
|M1 ∩ (M/ρ)| = |M1 ∩M |+ w(ρ) .
Proof. Let ρ = ((x0, y0), · · · , (xr−1, yr−1)) be a rotation exposed in the stable matching M . In
the following, all subscripts i + 1 are taken modulo r. By the definition of M/ρ we have that
M/ρ = {{x, y} ∈ M | (x, y) /∈ ρ} ⊎ {{xi, yi+1} | 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1}. Thus, we prove the statement
by showing the following; note that no {xi, yi} belongs to M/ρ, 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1.
|M1 ∩ (M/ρ)| =|M1 ∩
(
(M/ρ) ∩M
)
|+ |M1 ∩
(
(M/ρ) \M
)
|
=|{{x, y} ∈M1 | {x, y} ∈M ∧ (x, y) /∈ ρ}|+
|{{x, y} ∈M1 | (x, y) = (xi, yi+1) for some 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1}|
=|{{x, y} ∈M1 ∩M}| − |{{x, y} ∈M1 ∩M | (x, y) ∈ ρ}|+
|{{x, y} ∈M1 | (x, y) = (xi, yi+1) for some 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1}|
=|M1 ∩M |+ w(ρ).
Note that the second to last equation holds because (x, y) ∈ ρ implies that {x, y} ∈M .
By applying Lemma 8 repeatedly, we obtain the following.
Corollary 1. If C ⊆ R2 is the (unique) closed subset of rotations associated with stable match-
ing M of P2, then |M1 ∩M | = |M1 ∩M0|+
∑
ρ∈C w(ρ).
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Since a stable matching M2 for P2 with minimum symmetric difference dist(M1,M2) has the
maximum intersection M1 ∩M2, we obtain the following.
Lemma 9. Let M2 be a stable matching for P2 and let C be the associated closed subset of
rotations. Then, dist(M1,M2) ≤ k if and only if
∑
ρ∈C w(ρ) ≥
dist(M1,M0)−k
2 .
Proof. By the definition of symmetric difference, we derive the following.
dist(M1,M2) = |M1|+ |M2| − 2|M1 ∩M2|. (12)
Since for preferences without ties, all stable matchings match the same set of agents (Proposition 1),
we have that |M0| = |M2|. Together with Corollary 1, (12) is equivalent to
dist(M1,M2) = |M1|+ |M0| − 2

|M1 ∩M0|+∑
ρ∈C
w(ρ)


= dist(M1,M0)− 2
∑
ρ∈C
w(ρ).
Our statement follows immediately.
By the above, our problem reduces to finding a maximum-weight closed subset of rotations.
In the following, we show that the sum of the weights of the rotations is at most n and finding
such a subset of rotations can thus be done efficiently.
Lemma 10.
∑
ρ∈R2
w(ρ) ≤ |M1| and finding a closed subset of rotations with maximum weight
can be done in O(n3) time.
Proof. Slightly abusing the intersection notation, for each rotation ρ = ((x0, y0), · · · , (xr−1, yr−1)) ∈
R2 we define ρ ∩M1 := {(xi, yi+1) | {xi, yi+1 ∈M1}} (i+ 1 is taken modulo r).
Next, observe that by one of the statement in [17, Lemma 3.2.1] implies that for each
pair (x, y) there exists at most one rotation ρ such that (x, y) ∈ ρ∩M1. Moreover, by definition,
we have that w(ρ) ≤ |ρ ∩M1|. Summarizing, we have that
∑
ρ∈R2
w(ρ) ≤
∑
ρ∈R2
|ρ ∩M1| = |
⋃
ρ∈R2
(ρ ∩M1)| ≤ |M1|.
Gusfield and Irving [17, Theorem 3.6.2] showed that finding a maximum-weight closed subset
of rotations can be reduced to finding a minimum s-t cut in a specific flow network which features
the precedence relation of the rotations, where the numbers of vertices and arcs are in O(n2)
and the minimum cost of an s-t cut is bounded by the sum of the weights of the rotations.
The latter problem can be solved in O(|E| · w) time (by using Ford-Fulkerson’s algorithm),
where |E| denotes the number of arcs in the network and w is the cost of the minimum s-t cut.
Since |E| ∈ O(n2) and since w ≤
∑
ρ∈R2
w(ρ), we can find a maximum-weight closed subset of
rotations in O(n2 · |M1|) = O(n
3) time.
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B Additional Material for Section 3
Example 1 ([16]). To get better acquainted with Irving’s algorithm and, more importantly, the
notion of rotations, their exposition, and their elimination, we give an example illustrating this.
Consider the following profile with eight agents—the complete profile is to the left and the Phase 1
table is to the right. For the sake of readability, the symbol ≻ between the agents in the preference
lists of each agent are omitted.
1 7 2 6 8 5 3 4
2 4 6 5 3 8 1 7
3 5 2 1 7 4 6 8
4 1 7 3 6 5 8 2
5 7 1 8 4 6 2 3
6 7 3 8 4 5 1 2
7 2 8 4 3 5 6 1
8 4 2 3 5 6 7 1
1 2 6 5 3 4
2 6 5 3 8 1
3 5 2 1 7 4 6
4 1 7 3 6 5 8
5 7 1 8 4 6 2 3
6 3 8 4 5 1 2
7 8 4 3 5
8 4 2 5 6 7
In the Phase 1 table, there are two rotations: ρ1 = ((1, 2), (2, 6), (3, 5)) and ρ2 = ((4, 1), (5, 7)).
Now, we eliminate the rotation ρ1, that is, we remove
• the top choices for agents 1, 2, 3 and
• 8, 1 from the preference list of agent 2, since 2 finds 3 better than these two and is becoming
the top choice for 3.
After the elimination of ρ1, we obtain the following table.
1 6 5 3 4
2 5 3
3 2 1 7 4 6
4 1 7 3 6 5 8
5 7 1 8 4 6 2
6 3 8 4 5 1
7 8 4 3 5
8 4 5 6 7
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